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ACKNOWLEDGING INFORMAL POWER DYNAMICS IN  
THE WORKPLACE: A PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY DOCTRINE IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT CASES 
SUSAN D. CARLE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I evaluate courts’ application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
affirmative defense doctrine in hostile environment sexual harassment cases.  
This doctrine provides that employers may avoid being held vicariously liable for 
hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors if they can establish that: 
(1) they have taken reasonable measures to prevent sexual harassment, including 
setting up adequate complaint procedures, and (2) the employee who suffered sexual 
harassment unreasonably failed to avail herself of these procedures.  The affirmative 
defense doctrine is U.S. Supreme Court-made law, developed in a series of cases 
discussed below. 
The affirmative defense doctrine has merits.  As the Court and 
commentators have correctly pointed out, the availability of an affirmative 
defense to employer vicarious liability in supervisor hostile environment sexual 
harassment cases serves important policy objectives.  Chief among those 
objectives is the creation of incentives for employers to design and implement 
policies that will deter and punish sexual harassment at the workplace level, 
avoiding the need to involve the courts.1  The power of the Court to shape 
employers’ policies through the law is demonstrated by the cottage industry of 
sexual harassment training that arose after the Supreme Court articulated the 
affirmative defense doctrine, through which employment lawyers and other 
consultants have done good business advising employers about implementing 
 
 * Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, American University 
Washington College of Law.  This Article is an extension of a presentation given at the 2005 Law & 
Society Annual Meeting.  It also draws on the author’s work as an attorney at the labor law firm of Bredhoff 
& Kaiser, in Washington, D.C., from 1991-97, where she was involved in sexual harassment consulting and 
training.  She wishes to thank Candace Kovacic-Fleischer and Ann McGinley for extremely helpful comments 
on earlier drafts, Hilary Dengel and Rebecca Geller for outstanding research assistance, and Aric 
Elsenheimer for discussions about his Note on a related topic.  See Aric G. Elsenheimer, Agency and Liability in Sexual 
Harassment Law: Toward a Broader Definition of Tangible Employment Actions, 54 AM. U. L. REV.  1635 (2005). 
 1. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 489 (2001) (“The Supreme Court’s structural approach encourages the 
development of a dynamic regulatory regime through ongoing interaction between general legal 
norms and workplace problem solving.”). 
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sexual harassment policies.2  Having been involved in some of that work myself, 
I have no complaints about the incentive-creating dimension of the Court’s 
affirmative defense doctrine.  On the other hand, I have increasing reservations 
about the way the courts have applied the affirmative defense doctrine in 
subsequent case law, and that is my topic here. 
I will argue that the courts’ current, extremely confused and contorted 
articulation of that doctrine contravenes the policy underlying recognition of 
hostile environment sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.  I do so by 
discussing in detail several recent examples of courts’ application of the affirmative 
defense doctrine.  I then draw on the excellent, burgeoning literature on sexual 
harassment law and on the research of experts who study organizational 
dynamics to argue that courts’ application of the affirmative defense writes out of 
sexual harassment law concern for the operation of informal power dynamics in 
the workplace.  I propose an alternative approach that would call on courts to 
engage in a more searching inquiry into the ways in which power dynamics in the 
workplace may prevent persons who have suffered sexual harassment from 
making effective use of sexual harassment policies.  Stated more simply, my 
argument is that employers should be held vicariously liable for the actions of 
employees who commit sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe to 
constitute hostile environment sex discrimination when those employees have 
abused the power granted to them by their agency relationship to the employer.  
If employees abuse power granted to them by their employer by carrying out 
sexual harassment―by credibly threatening retaliation, ordering an employee to 
carry out particular acts or otherwise exercising credible intimidation tactics― 
they have been “aided in the agency” in carrying out their harassment by the 
power conferred on them by their employer.  To determine whether a harasser 
has used employer-granted power in this way, courts should place far greater 
weight on evidence reflecting the power dynamics in particular workplaces. 
To be sure, the approach I advocate demands a far more searching inquiry 
than that courts typically engage in when considering employers’ affirmative 
defenses.  But it conforms to the Supreme Court’s test in Ellerth, which asks 
whether the employer’s sexual harassment prevention policies are effective and 
whether the plaintiff’s failure to report or otherwise avoid the harassment is 
reasonable.  Employer sexual harassment policies that allow employees to use 
power conferred on them by virtue of their agency relationship with their 
employer to carry out sexual harassment are not effective in deterring sexual 
harassment within the meaning of Ellerth, and plaintiffs who submit to 
harassment or do not seek redress for it under conditions that permit harassers 
to abuse their employer-granted power in such a manner have not acted 
unreasonably.  Finally, I demonstrate that this proposal is feasible by pointing to 
examples of courts that have engaged in such searching, fact-sensitive analyses. 
 
 2. See Lehr, Middlebrooks, Price & Procter, P.C., A Primer on Employee Complaints, ALA. EMP. L. 
LETTER, July 2002 (noting the cottage industry that developed in sexual harassment consulting); 
Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Employment Consultants: Friend or Foe?, W. VA. EMP. L. LETTER, Dec. 2001. 
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II.  THE ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
As already noted, the affirmative defense to supervisor hostile environment 
sexual harassment arises from a series of cases in which the Supreme Court first 
recognized the theory of hostile environment sexual harassment, but then sought 
to develop doctrines to limit employers’ vicarious liability for the actions of their 
supervisory employees. 
A. The Beginnings of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Law 
The key U.S. Supreme Court case recognizing hostile environment sexual 
harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII3 was Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson. 4  It is worth revisiting the facts of this landmark case because, 
under subsequent doctrinal developments, Vinson might not have a strong 
case today.  Vinson worked at a bank.5  Bank vice president Sidney Taylor 
had hired her and was her supervisor.6  For the four years during which 
Vinson worked under Taylor, he made repeated requests for sexual favors, 
leading to forty to fifty incidents of sexual intercourse.7  Vinson initially 
resisted the requests for sex but eventually gave in out of what she described as 
fear of losing her job.8  In the words of the Court: “[Vinson] testified that 
because she was afraid of Taylor she never reported the harassment to any of his 
supervisors and never attempted to use the bank’s complaint procedure.” 9 
The District Court for the District of Columbia found that the bank could 
not be held liable for Taylor’s actions.10  The court noted that the bank had an 
express policy against discrimination, but that neither Vinson nor any of the 
other employees whom Taylor had sexually harassed had ever lodged a sexual 
harassment complaint under the bank’s complaint procedures.11  The court thus 
concluded that “the bank was without notice and cannot be held liable for the 
alleged actions of Taylor.”12  The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that employers 
should be absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by supervisory 
personnel, regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known about 
it.13 
 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 4. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 5. Id. at 59-60. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 60.  The harassment she suffered in the hands of Taylor included being fondled in 
front of other employees and several incidents of forcible rape.  Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 61. 
 10. Id at 57.  The court also found that the sexual relationship between Taylor and Vinson 
was voluntary and thus not actionable under Title VII, a finding the Supreme Court also rejected.  
See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 11. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 62. 
 12. Id. (quoting Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 42). 
 13. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  The court of appeals further held 
that hostile environment sexual harassment constituted a form of sex discrimination under Title VII 
and that the district court erred in refusing to consider this theory.  Id. at 145-46. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court agreed in part with the D.C. Circuit and ruled on 
several important issues related to sexual harassment liability.  First, it held that, 
“[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of 
the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”14  
Second, the Court rejected the bank’s argument that sexual harassment by a 
supervisor should be actionable under Title VII only when it involves tangible loss 
of an economic character.15  The Court held that Congress’s intent was to “strike at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment,” including not only “the grant or denial 
of an economic quid pro quo,” but also “so-called hostile environment” 
harassment, when the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”16 
Finally, the Court began the first of what would become a series of 
increasingly complex discussions about the agency principles that should apply 
in determining an employer’s vicarious liability for a supervisor’s sexual 
harassment in hostile environment cases.  The Court noted that Congress had 
defined the term “employer” in Title VII to include any “agent” of an employer.17  
But the Court reasoned that Congress had not intended to render employers 
always automatically liable for sexual harassment by supervisors.18  Conversely, 
the Court stated, absence of notice to an employer should not necessarily protect 
the employer from liability.19  The Court thus rejected the bank’s argument that it 
should be insulated from liability because it had a complaint procedure and a 
policy against discrimination, which Vinson failed to take advantage of.20  The 
complaint procedure and anti-discrimination policy were general and did not alert 
employees of their employer’s interest in stopping the particular form of 
discrimination involved in sexual harassment.21  Furthermore, the Court noted, the 
complaint procedure would have required Vinson to bring her complaint first to 
the attention of her supervisor, who was the very person committing the 
harassment.22  The Court thus affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer,23 and left to another day the 
project of issuing definitive rules on employers’ vicarious liability in supervisor 
hostile environment cases. 
B. Ellerth and its Aftermath 
The next set of Supreme Court cases to lay important new ground in 
defining the scope of employers’ vicarious liability in supervisor hostile 
 
 14. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64. 
 15. Id. at 68. 
 16. Id. at 64-67.  The Court further corrected the district court on the matter of voluntariness, 
noting that the correct question was whether the sexual advances were “unwelcome.”  Id. at 68. 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
 18. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 72-73. 
 22. Id. at 73. 
 23. Id. 
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environment cases are the companion cases of Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth24 
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.25  In Ellerth, a female salesperson alleged that 
she had been subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor, Ted 
Slowik.26  Slowik was a “mid-level” manager, with authority to make hiring and 
promotion decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor, who signed the 
paperwork.27  He was not Ellerth’s immediate supervisor.28  Ellerth answered to 
her office colleague in the Chicago office, who in turn answered to Slowik in 
New York.29 
Slowik made various boorish and sexual comments to Ellerth and told her 
several times to “loosen up” and dress more sexually if she wanted her career in the 
company to go well.30  He also expressed reservations about Ellerth while 
interviewing her for a promotion, because she was not “loose enough,” although 
she did receive the promotion in the end.31  After an incident in which Slowik told 
Ellerth that wearing shorter skirts would make her job a lot easier, Ellerth’s 
immediate supervisor warned her about failing to return phone calls to customers 
promptly.32  In response, Ellerth quit, and a short time later alleged that Slowik 
had been sexually harassing her.33  During her period of employment at 
Burlington, however, Ellerth had not informed anyone in authority about Slowik’s 
conduct, despite knowing that Burlington had a policy against sexual 
harassment.34  She did not tell her immediate supervisor because she thought he 
would have to report her complaint to his supervisor, who was Slowik.35 
On summary judgment, the district court found that Ellerth’s allegations met 
the severe and pervasive standard for hostile environment sexual harassment 
cases, but ruled against Ellerth on vicarious liability grounds.36  On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, produced eight separate opinions and no 
consensus for a controlling rationale on the agency principles that should govern 
employer vicarious liability in supervisor hostile environment cases.37 
The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion drafted by Justice Kennedy, 
announced an affirmative defense to employer vicarious liability in such cases.  
The Court recognized that common law agency principles could result in the broad 
imposition of vicarious liability on an employer for employee wrongdoing, noting 
that “the concept of scope of employment has not always been construed to require 
a motive to serve the employer.”38  Nevertheless, the Court chose to follow a line of 
 
 24. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 25. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 26. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 748. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 749. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 757 (citation omitted). 
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doctrine that looks to whether an agent’s acts are for the purpose of serving the 
employer or for personal purposes.39  In the latter case, vicarious liability on the 
part of the principal may not apply.40  Since “a supervisor acting out of gender-
based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual urges may not be actuated by a purpose to 
serve the employer”41 but rather out of personal motives, the Court reasoned that 
sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of 
employment.42 
The Court also briefly discussed the “aided in the agency” standard for 
imposing vicarious liability under section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency.43  The Court reasoned that such an analysis arguably could apply to all 
workplace sexual harassment, since harassers are aided in accomplishing their 
tortious objective by “[p]roximity and regular contact” with a “pool of potential 
victims.”44  But the Court reasoned that this alone could not be enough, because it 
would render employers vicariously liable for all co-worker and supervisor 
harassment.45  On the other hand, the Court reasoned, supervisors who had taken a 
“tangible employment action” against an employee who was being sexually 
harassed clearly had been aided by the agency relationship with the employer, 
or principal, since they had used the authority granted to them by the employer 
to punish the harassee by causing tangible injury related to the harassee’s 
employment.46 
The Court in Ellerth noted that Slowik had threatened to take negative 
employment action against Ellerth as a negative quid pro quo for refusing his 
sexual requests, but he had not carried out those threats.47  The developing 
jurisprudence in sexual harassment cases imposed automatic liability on 
employers in quid pro quo cases, on the theory that in such cases supervisors 
clearly were acting as agents of the employer and using their authority, vested in 
them by virtue of their supervisory powers within the company, to extract sex 
from a subordinate.48  This doctrine, the Court noted, encouraged plaintiffs to 
plead their cases as quid pro quo claims, and thus had put expansive pressure 
on the definition of quid pro quo sexual harassment.49  The Court resisted further 
expansion of the quid pro quo concept.50  The mere threat of negative employment 
action, the Ellerth Court reasoned, should not be enough to impose automatic 
liability on the employer, because in such cases the facts do not show that the 
 
 39. Id. at 756-59. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 756. 
 42. Id. at 757. 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958) (“A master is not subject to 
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless . . . he was 
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”). 
 44. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 760-61. 
 47. See id. at 748. 
 48. Id. at 752-53. 
 49. Id. at 753. 
 50. Id. at 753-54. 
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supervisor did in fact take action as an agent of the employer.51  On this reasoning, 
the Court concluded that automatic employer liability should be reserved for 
cases involving tangible employment action, which “in most cases inflicts direct 
economic harm”52 and is “an official company act.”53  These harms, the Court 
reasoned, are ones that only supervisors can inflict.54 
I dispute this assumption later in this Article, but even if it were true, it 
does not as a matter of logic follow that all a supervisor can do to alter the terms 
and conditions of a harrasee’s employment is inflict a tangible employment 
action.  An employee with power in the workplace can make the work life of 
another employee miserable, and thus alter that employee’s “terms and 
conditions of employment,” in many ways other than those encompassed by the 
concept of tangible employment action.  In any event, the Court’s introduction of 
the term “tangible employment action” to define the cases that warrant automatic 
employer liability did not advance the law very far: Cases involving tangible 
employment actions usually fall within the quid pro quo category, and the 
Court’s earlier quid pro quo analysis had already established that automatic 
liability would apply.55 
Moreover, the tangible employment action test is inconsistent with the theory 
of why hostile environment sexual harassment constitutes a cause of action under 
Title VII in the first place.  The question of whether a plaintiff suffered a tangible 
employment action does not address the key issue underlying hostile environment 
claims.  That issue, as Vinson established, is whether the harassment was 
sufficiently severe as to alter the terms and conditions of the employee’s 
employment such that he or she suffered discrimination on account of sex.56  
Actions other than tangible employment actions—including threats of tangible 
employment actions, other kinds of significant intimidation, and severe harassment 
itself—clearly can alter the terms and conditions of employment that a sexually 
harassed employee has to endure.  Employees subject to severe and pervasive 
sexual harassment have to contend with materially worse conditions of 
employment than do employees who are not subject to such harassment on the 
basis of their sex.  This is why hostile environment sexual harassment can give rise 
to an actionable Title VII claim.  But the Court in Ellerth gave little attention to this 
fundamental underpinning of the theory as to why hostile environment sexual 
harassment constitutes a form of sex discrimination for which employers should be 
liable. 
 
 51. See id. at 752 (stating that hostile environment claims require severe or pervasive 
harassment). 
 52. Id. at 762. 
 53. Id.  Note here that the Court switches between the terms, “tangible employment action” and 
“official company act,” which are not, after all, synonymous.  In so doing the Court adds still more 
confusion to an area of law already mired in ambiguity.  For this and other reasons, the tangible 
employment term is another misstep, but I will not go into those other reasons here.  Instead, my 
focus remains on the general vicarious liability analysis and its inconsistency with the purposes of 
Title VII. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 762. 
 56. Id. at 752; Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-67. 
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Instead of ending the scheme of proof for hostile environment cases with the 
plaintiff’s showing of harassment sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the 
terms and conditions of employment, the Court adopted an affirmative defense 
proposed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)57 and 
approved by some lower courts in prior cases.  The affirmative defense allows 
employers to avoid vicarious liability in cases involving no tangible employment 
action if they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following two 
elements: 
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.58 
This language appears sufficiently broad to support a searching, context-
specific examination of the reasonableness of the employer’s care and of the 
plaintiff’s efforts to avoid harm.  What “reasonable” steps employers are to take is 
open to further development, as is the question of when employees act 
“unreasonably” in failing to avail themselves of preventive or corrective 
opportunities.  Indeed, the Court’s companion case, Faragher, easily concluded 
the same day that a city pool’s flimsy sexual harassment procedure did not pass 
muster under the Ellerth affirmative defense doctrine.59  But the Court’s next 
major case, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders60 presented a less encouraging 
picture. 
The central issue on review in Suders was whether a constructive 
discharge—that is, an employee’s reasonable resignation in response to 
intolerable working conditions—should be equated with a tangible employment 
action, so that the affirmative defense doctrine would not be available in 
constructive discharge cases.61  The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsberg, 
concluded that constructive discharge was not a tangible employment action in 
itself; rather courts should examine the facts alleged to determine whether the 
working conditions under which the employee reasonably felt compelled to resign 
included tangible employment actions such as a demotion.62  In so concluding, 
Justice Ginsberg admonished courts not to engage in the formalist logic inherent 
in the argument that a constructive discharge, being a form of discharge, 
necessarily and always should be categorized as a tangible employment action.63 
 
 57. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS 13-14 (1999). 
 58. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 59. See Faragher,  524 U.S. at 808-09.  The policy’s inadequacies included the facts that it had not 
been disseminated among employees, management had made no attempt to keep track of 
supervisors’ conduct under the policy, and the policy did not include any assurance that harassing 
supervisors could be bypassed in registering complaints.  See id. 
 60. 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
 61. Id. at 134. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 148-52. 
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Many analysts have pondered, both before and after Suders, how best to 
classify constructive discharge for purposes of sexual harassment law.64  The 
constructive discharge issue is a question related to my topic, since it involves, in 
Justice Ginsberg’s apt words, hostile environment harassment “ratcheted up to 
the breaking point.”65  Rather than becoming sidetracked by the constructive 
discharge debate, however, I will focus on Suders’ general discussion of the 
vicarious liability principles that apply to supervisor hostile environment sexual 
harassment.  Quite apart from its treatment of the constructive discharge issue, 
Suders has had the effect of constricting still further plaintiffs’ ability to survive 
employers’ motions for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense to 
vicarious liability. 
In some of its language in Suders, the Court appeared to replace, or at least to 
gloss, the more carefully nuanced language of Ellerth quoted above, which 
emphasized a reasonableness analysis, with cruder bright line rules.  The Court 
articulated the two prongs of the affirmative defense for cases not involving an 
“employer-sanctioned adverse action officially changing her employment 
status,’’66 as follows: 
An employer [must show] both (1) that it had installed a readily accessible and 
effective policy for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, 
and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of that employer-
provided preventative or remedial apparatus.67 
With this language, the Court, perhaps unintentionally, appeared to signal a 
willingness to routinize, or make more perfunctory, the analysis it expects of the 
lower courts in evaluating employers’ affirmative defense claims.  The focus is on 
whether the employer has a sex harassment policy in place and whether the 
plaintiff failed to use it.  To be sure, the Court in Suders uses the terms “readily 
accessible” and “effective” in describing the policies employers must have for 
reporting and resolving sexual harassment complaints, and also repeats the 
requirement that courts must inquire into the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
decisions about using such procedures.  But lower courts have deemphasized 
these descriptors and have looked simply at whether the employer has a policy 
and whether the plaintiff used it.  This unduly limited inquiry typifies many 
lower courts’ application of the affirmative defense, in cases decided both before 
and after Suders, as I discuss below.  Courts use the affirmative defense to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ cases at the summary judgment stage even when there are important 
facts in dispute about the adequacy and effectiveness of employer sexual 
harassment policies. 
C. How the Courts Are Getting it Wrong: Cases Following Ellerth 
My informal survey of the case law shows that, in numerous cases across the 
country, plaintiffs are losing sexual harassment cases at the summary judgment 
 
 64. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 307, 385 (2004). 
 65. Suders, 524 U.S. at 131. 
 66. Id.  at 134. 
 67. Id. 
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stage based on the employer’s assertion of the Ellerth affirmative defense, even 
though they have alleged facts that should allow them to recover if proven at 
trial.68  This impressionistic finding is consistent with the findings of other scholars 
who are critical of Ellerth and of the development of sexual harassment law in 
general.69  Under the current state of the law, all an employer needs to do to avoid 
vicarious liability is to show that it has implemented a standard sexual 
harassment policy and that the plaintiff did not use it.70  If courts spend any time 
at all examining a plaintiff’s allegations that it was not reasonable to resort to the 
sexual harassment policy under the circumstances, which they generally do not, 
they discuss this question simply to dismiss the plaintiff’s assertions.71 
I will discuss just a few examples in detail that illustrate the general picture 
of what is occurring in the lower courts’ implementation of the Ellerth affirmative 
defense doctrine.  For ease of analysis, I divide my discussion into supervisor and 
co-worker cases, although an important part of my argument in Part III questions 
the advisability of continuing this doctrinal distinction. 
1. Supervisor Cases 
Here I discuss three factual scenarios involving supervisor sexual 
harassment in which I believe courts have wrongly applied the affirmative 
defense doctrine.  First, consider the facts in Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp.72  Each 
of the two female plaintiffs in that case had held the job of night shift cashier at a 
gas station.73  One employee worked for three weeks and then quit; the second 
took her place and worked for approximately three months before quitting.74  The 
position required each plaintiff to work alone on the overnight shift in a small 
booth measuring seven feet by seven feet.75  Toward the end of their shift, their 
supervisor, the station manager, would come in to work in the cramped booth 
with them.76  The plaintiffs both alleged that this station manager rubbed himself 
against them and made verbal comments of a sexual nature, including profanity, 
 
 68. My survey includes only cases in legal databases easily accessible for legal research.  One 
can only wonder about the many additional cases dismissed on summary judgment at the trial court 
level that do not turn up in these databases. 
 69. For my discussion, I have chosen to highlight cases other than those other scholars have 
examined.  Surveys that review cases other than the ones I focus on here include John H. Marks, 
Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary 
Judgment Safe Harbor For Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace 
Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1423-36 (2002) (summarizing cases demonstrating weakness of 
hostile environment doctrine in light of the affirmative defense); David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & 
Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical 
Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1265-85 (2001) (statistical analyses of cases decided shortly after Ellerth); 
Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. 
L. REV. 457, 461-494 (2002).  See also articles cited in infra note 146. 
 70. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 57-67. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998). 
 73. Id. at 1381. 
 74. Id. at 1382. 
 75. Id. at 1381. 
 76. Id. 
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name calling and sexual insinuations.77  One plaintiff alleged that he forced open 
the door and forcibly kissed her while she was using the station’s bathroom.78  
As already noted, each plaintiff lasted only a short time on the job, and neither 
reported the harassment until after she resigned, even though both admitted that 
they had signed a form acknowledging that they had been informed of the 
company’s sexual harassment procedure, which required them to phone a 
complaint to the company’s personnel manager, located at another site.79  Neither 
employee was given a copy of the policy, however, nor was this policy or the 
phone number of the personnel manager posted in the station.80  Nevertheless, 
the court granted summary judgment to the employer on the ground that it had 
an adequate policy and the plaintiffs had failed to use it.81 
This is obviously an incorrect result.  Applying the reasonableness standard 
the Court articulated in Ellerth, one must ask, from the standpoint of the objective 
reasonable person in the circumstances, whether a rational person can be 
expected to continue to work alone, at night, in a tiny, confined space with a 
supervisor engaged in escalating, physically threatening sexual harassment, after 
having reported the supervisor for misconduct to an unknown person at a distant 
location.  Surely in these particular circumstances, a finder of fact could 
reasonably conclude that quitting and then complaining was reasonable conduct 
on the part of the plaintiffs.  In other words, the court in Jones misapplied the 
second prong of the Court’s affirmative defense: the employer had not 
established for purposes of summary judgment that a reasonable fact finder 
would reject plaintiffs’ claim that their failure to report their supervisor’s 
misconduct before quitting was reasonable under the circumstances.82 
As a second example, consider Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,83 in 
which two female store clerks filed suit for hostile environment sexual 
harassment against Publix Supermarkets after they were subjected to an 
escalating problem of inappropriate touching, hugging, and kissing by their 
supervisor, Ronald Selph, the store manager.84  The plaintiffs were subjected to 
this conduct for an unreasonable amount of time before management put a stop 
to it.85  Both plaintiffs complained about Selph’s behavior on numerous occasions 
to three mid-level managers at the store.86  One plaintiff told a manager that 
Selph had grabbed her and kissed her on the neck and that she did not know 
what to do about his behavior.87  The manager responded that he was “shocked” 
by Selph’s behavior and “didn’t know what to say either.”88  Another manager 
took the step of warning Selph that his conduct amounted to sexual harassment, 
 
 77. Id. at 1382. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1384. 
 81. Id. at 1384, 1386. 
 82. See id. at 1386. 
 83. 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 84. Id. at 1293. 
 85. Id. at 1295. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1293. 
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but Selph responded that he did not care.89  Two managers who witnessed 
incidents told one of the plaintiffs that they would take steps to bring the 
problem to the attention of higher management.90  One of the plaintiffs requested 
that one of these managers set up a meeting with the district manager so that 
they could complain about Selph’s conduct and this meeting later took place.91  
The district manager immediately investigated, told the plaintiffs that he was 
upset because “the managers knew better and should have let him know what 
was going on,” and gave Selph a demotion, written warning, and transfer to 
another city.92 
Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer 
based on the Ellerth affirmative defense, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the 
plaintiffs’ earlier complaints to managers in their store about the sexual 
harassment they were experiencing months before did not suffice to put the 
employer on notice about the harassment.93  Plaintiffs provided evidence in the 
record that another employee had also complained to mid-level managers about 
Selph’s harassing behavior six months prior to their complaints, and that the 
managers had attempted unsuccessfully to handle the problem “in the store.”94  
But the court held that this evidence was not relevant to when Publix should be 
considered to have been on notice about Selph’s behavior, because that prior 
complaint, too, had not been brought to the attention of Publix’s higher 
management.95 
At no point does the court consider the possibility that the plaintiffs’ 
attempts to complain to mid-level managers in the store were reasonable under 
the circumstances.  Nor does the court examine, with any real attempt to shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant, the deficiencies of Publix’s anti-harassment 
policies in failing to train its mid-level managers on what to do when they 
become aware of sexual harassment.  As the case stands, the employer escapes 
vicarious liability for two rounds of blatant and pervasive sexual harassment by 
the head manager of one of its stores, despite other on-site managers having been 
made repeatedly and vividly aware of the problem.  In short, in Madray as in other 
cases, even reasonable attempts by plaintiffs to bring sexual harassment to the 
attention of management, and failures on employers’ part to have adequate 
policies to deal with such situations, survive summary judgment for the employer 
under the Ellerth affirmative defense.96 
In other cases, the facts supporting the plaintiff’s claim of hostile 
environment discrimination are weak for various reasons but, instead of 
acknowledging this, the court incorrectly grants summary judgment under 
 
 89. Id. at 1294. 
 90. Id. at 1293-94. 
 91. Id. at 1294. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1294 n.3. 
 95. Id. at 1294. 
 96. Collette v. Stein-Mart, Inc., 126 F. App’x. (6th Cir. 2005) is a similar case in which the Sixth 
Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment under the Ellerth defense despite the fact that the 
plaintiff had complained to mid-level managers. 
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Ellerth instead.  Consider, for example, Thompson v. Naphcare, Inc.97  The plaintiff 
in that case was a registered nurse supervisor who worked for the defendant 
health care services provider, Naphcare, in a correctional institution.98  On July 3, 
2000, Ronald Isaac was appointed as her supervisor.99  In the period of 
approximately two months during which Thompson continued on the job after 
Isaac’s appointment, Isaac engaged in five acts that Thompson viewed as sexual 
harassment.100  On his first day on the job, he told Thompson that she had a figure 
that college girls would envy and that she should leave her husband behind and 
take Isaac on vacation with her.101  On other occasions, he touched her in an 
intrusive manner by rubbing her shoulders.102  Finally, he informed her in a 
private conference that it was his job to protect her from other personnel and that 
if she were “not so wrapped up with” her husband, she would see “what Isaac 
could do for her.”103 
After this initial period of sex talk, which Thompson rebuffed, Isaac’s 
attitude changed.104  According to Thompson, Isaac began berating her for 
negligible mistakes, told her that she was unprofessional, and threatened to 
replace her.105  He issued written warnings to her for spending too much time with 
patients and discussed extending her probationary period because of performance 
problems.106 
On August 30, Thompson consulted an attorney about Isaac’s behavior.107  
The attorney wrote a letter, dated September 5, to her supervisor.108  Two days 
later, two corporate officials, Naphcare’s director of human resources and its in-
house counsel, went to the work site to investigate the charges in Thompson’s 
attorney’s letter.109  They interviewed witnesses Thompson had identified.110  One 
witness recalled hearing the conversation in which Isaac stated that he wanted to 
go on vacation with Thompson, but “did not find Isaac’s comments to be 
inappropriate or offensive.”111  Other witnesses similarly “denied witnessing any 
inappropriate behavior on the part of Isaac.”112  The two corporate officials 
concluded that they were “unable to substantiate the charges raised in the 
letter.”113  They told Isaac not to communicate with Thompson without other 
employees being present and left the work site, after which Isaac “approached 
 
 97. 117 F. App’x. 317 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Id. at 319. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 320. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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Thompson to apologize and tried to explain his position.”114  Thompson again 
complained to the director of human resources, who phoned Isaac’s supervisor to 
tell him to tell Isaac not to attempt to speak to Thompson about the matter.115  
Naphcare then officially informed Thompson that it could not substantiate her 
allegations, and shortly thereafter she resigned from her position.116 
Affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit 
questioned whether the alleged incidents rose to the level of actionable sexual 
harassment.117  Instead of ruling on this ground, however, the court concluded that, 
even if Isaac’s actions had created a hostile working environment, “we would 
exonerate Naphcare on its affirmative defense.”118  In support of this reasoning, 
the court pointed to the facts that Naphcare had a complaint procedure in place, 
the plaintiff did not immediately use it,119 and Naphcare sent two high-level 
company officials to the work site after receiving the plaintiff’s complaint.120  
Despite the fact that these officials announced that they could not substantiate the 
complaint, the court concluded that “the employer’s response to her complaint was 
not ineffectual,” because Thompson did not allege that the harassment continued 
after Isaac’s last attempt to approach Thompson to talk about the incident.121 
Missing in the court’s discussion is sensitivity to the plaintiff’s perspective.  
The court did not consider whether the two-month delay in reporting Isaac to 
management was reasonable in the context of what began as fairly mild 
harassment, nor does it address Thompson’s claims that Isaac began to treat her 
negatively after she rebuffed his overtures.  The court’s discussion of the 
investigation by Naphcare’s human resources director and in-house counsel 
similarly fails to convince.  As even the court’s very short discussion reveals, at 
least one witness confirmed that one incident alleged by Thompson did in fact 
occur.122  Startlingly, the court did not question the employer’s termination of the 
investigation after finding such confirming evidence, but concluded that the 
employer’s finding that the plaintiff’s allegations “could not be substantiated,” 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Here the court may have been right.  Not all sex-talk a worker finds uncomfortable does, or 
indeed, should, rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment, lest sexual harassment law become 
a means of “sanitizing” work places and extending the state’s power to exert social control over its 
citizens through law.  See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2067 (2003) 
(arguing that “attempt[s] to banish sexuality from the workplace threaten many important social 
interests”). 
 118. Naphcare, 117 F. App’x. at 323. 
 119. See also McPherson v. City of Waukegan, No. 01 C 9264, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9098, at *22 
(N.D. Ill., May 29, 2003) (granting  summary judgment for the employer where plaintiff did not 
report initial incidents of harassment that escalated to sexual assault; although plaintiff reported the 
assault, the court held that she should have reported earlier incidents), aff’d, 379 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 
2004).  This and other similar cases represent yet another misstep in the development of sexual 
harassment law and place plaintiffs in a Catch-22 situation: They risk being found to have failed to 
invoke complaint procedures in a timely manner if they wait too long to report escalating 
harassment, yet if they invoke those procedures prematurely, they risk reporting conduct that is 
insufficiently severe to constitute sexual harassment. 
 120. Naphcare, 117 F. App’x. at 324. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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was correct.123  A plausible alternative explanation, given the facts as stated in 
the court’s opinion, is that the investigation and dismissal of the complaint 
constituted a whitewash job—one that sent a clear message to the plaintiff, and 
any other potential victims who learned of the company’s handling of the 
complaint, that allegations of sexual harassment would not be taken seriously 
even when a witnesses could confirm that an incident occurred. 
The point on which the court instead hangs its analysis is that the witnesses 
did not find Isaac’s behavior to be “inappropriate or offensive.”124  But the 
standard for what constitutes actionable sexual harassment surely should not use 
workplace norms as the measure.  It should be largely irrelevant to the legal 
analysis whether particular witnesses found the conduct inappropriate, lest 
workplace norms permitting or encouraging a culture of sexual harassment125 be 
permitted to continue because witnesses to harassment found the behavior 
unobjectionable.  The appropriate legal standard for determining whether 
conduct rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment is that of a reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s situation.126  Although one may doubt whether the 
plaintiff met that threshold—at least in her allegations about the initial 
harassment—that threshold is not the ground on which the Court disposes of the 
case.  It instead summarily dismisses on affirmative defense grounds, creating 
another precedent standing for the idea that the mere showing of the existence of 
a policy and a pro forma employer response under it satisfies the affirmative 
defense doctrine.127 
2. Co-worker Cases 
Other examples of cases in which courts have failed to appreciate the abuse 
of power in hostile environment cases involve co-worker harassment.  In co-
worker harassment cases, the courts do not ask whether the employee 
committing the harassment was “aided in the agency” relationship in carrying 
out the harassment, but instead apply a negligence analysis, which seeks to 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 320. 
 125. Vicki Schultz persuasively argues that these workplaces are precisely where enforcement of 
sexual harassment law is most important in furthering Title VII’s objective of eliminating sex 
discrimination in employment.  See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 
1683, 1736 (1998) (noting the way in which hostile environment sexual harassment can be used to 
deter women from working in traditionally sex-segregated workforce sectors). 
 126. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (requiring the plaintiff to show that 
the environment “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive”). 
 127. Other cases in which perfunctory employer investigations have sufficed to provide an 
affirmative defense include Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s lawsuit on summary judgment despite expert testimony that university’s investigation 
should have been more comprehensive, including an examination of supervisor’s computer for 
pornographic web site bookmarks); Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Nev. 2003) (granting 
summary judgment to the employer where employer had dismissed plaintiff’s claim of sexual 
harassment as unsubstantiated and transferred her to the graveyard shift, concluding that plaintiff 
failed to report the misconduct soon enough; employer’s investigation was sufficient, and 
undesirable transfer did not amount to a tangible job action). 
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ascertain whether employers knew or should have known about the harassment 
(usually to find that they did not).128 
In Baker v. Boeing Helicopters,129 the plaintiff worked at Boeing as an aircraft 
assembler.130  She was sexually harassed by a co-worker, Jack Moser, whom, the 
plaintiff alleged, made continuous harassing and threatening comments to her and 
on one occasion touched her on the breast.131  Moser, however, had “no authority, 
supervisory power, or opportunity to evaluate [her].”132  Boeing had implemented 
and informed its employees about its sexual harassment policy.133  When Moser 
continued to subject the plaintiff to harassing behavior and threatening comments, 
she reported Moser’s conduct, first to her union steward, who unsuccessfully tried to 
get Moser to stop, and then to her senior managers, who did succeed in 
reprimanding Moser in such a way that he stopped his physically harassing 
conduct.134  Her supervisors told her to report the problem to the employer’s Equal 
Employment Opportunities office, but she did not do so.135  She alleged, however, 
that this was because Moser had replaced his physically harassing conduct with 
another, more threatening form of harassment—namely, he threatened to do all he 
could to cause her to lose her job.136 
As mentioned, Moser was not a supervisor, but a co-worker, albeit a senior 
one who held the title of lead assembler and trained less-experienced workers.137  
Moser also had an additional source of power in the workplace: he was a union 
member and well connected with the union’s leadership.138  It was through these 
sources of informal power that Moser apparently made his threats credible to the 
plaintiff about the loss of her job, though the court’s discussion of the facts 
underlying the plaintiff’s allegation of further threatening harassment is too 
sketchy to give much of a picture of what occurred.  The court appeared to 
assume that these facts were completely inconsequential in any event, since it 
reasoned that “[p]laintiff’s co-worker lacked the potential to alter plaintiff’s 
employment,”139 and that the plaintiff had insufficient facts “to prove that 
 
 128. But an ironic result of courts’ misuse of the affirmative defense doctrine in supervisor cases, 
such as those discussed in Part II.C.1 above, is that the degree of scrutiny applied to the effectiveness 
of employers’ responses to co-worker sexual harassment is sometimes higher than that afforded in 
supervisor cases, even though the negligence standard for imposing liability on employers 
applicable to co-worker harassment is intended to be a harder one for plaintiffs to meet. See, e.g., 
Antonopoulos v. Zitnay, 360 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (D. Conn. 2005) (denying summary judgment to 
employer despite the fact that employer used corrective measures, including a verbal warning and 
written documentation in the harasser’s personnel file). 
 129. No. 01-3565, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12620, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2004). 
 130. Id. at *1. 
 131. Id. at *2. 
 132. Id. at *1. 
 133. Id. at *2. 
 134. Id. at *2-3. 
 135. Id. at *3. 
 136. Id. at *15. 
 137. Id. at *14. 
 138. Id. at *1. 
 139. Id. at *20. 
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management-level employees had actual or constructive knowledge”140 of the 
harassment that occurred after the first report. 
In short, in this case, and others,141 courts assume that employees who do not 
have formal supervisory status lack the ability, or agency, to abuse their position 
with the employer in order to carry out sexual harassment.  But that picture of the 
workplace belies what experts understand about how power operates in 
organizational settings, a topic I turn to in Part III below. 
III.  REFORMING THE TEST FOR  
VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CASES 
I have argued in Part II that courts are misapplying the Ellerth affirmative 
defense in hostile environment cases to bar plaintiffs from proceeding to trial.  
Although the plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts concerning the inadequacy 
of employers’ efforts to prevent and remedy sexual harassment, courts’ 
application of Ellerth precludes their cases from surviving summary judgment.  
Here, I will articulate how the Ellerth test should be formulated in order to 
encourage courts to engage in much more rigorous inquiry in assessing 
employers’ affirmative defense claims at the summary judgment stage. 
The first element of my proposal is this: courts should follow the Supreme 
Court’s own admonishments and avoid use of unduly formalistic categories of 
analysis in exploring whether hostile environment sex discrimination has 
occurred.  This is especially necessary in examining the dynamics of workplace 
settings, a context that calls out for realistic insights into the subtleties of particular 
situations.  Courts should examine the facts without immediately forcing them 
into dichotomies, such as those between quid pro quo and hostile environment, 
and between supervisor and co-worker harassment.142  These categories, while 
enormously helpful at a certain historical moment143 to aid the development of 
sexual harassment doctrine, now frequently obscure rather than shed light on the 
presence of actionable sexual harassment.  The question of whether sexual 
harassment is severe enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment is 
answered neither by focusing on whether a harasser is a supervisor or a co-worker, 
nor on whether tangible employment actions took place or were merely 
threatened.  The key question in vicarious liability cases should instead be whether 
 
 140. Id. at *17. 
 141. See e.g., Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 971-978 (7th Cir. 2004)  
(upholding grant of summary judgment despite acknowledgement that plaintiff had experienced 
hostile environment harassment by union representatives). 
 142. For examples of cases in which courts correctly recognize that an employee classified as a 
co-worker can in fact possess power over another employee for purposes of sexual harassment 
analysis, see Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2003) (harassing employee’s 
“authority over Mack, bestowed upon him by Otis, enabled him, or materially augmented his 
ability, to impose a hostile work environment on her” and he thus should be classified as a 
supervisor); Entrot v. Base Corp., 819 A.2d 447, 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (“instead of 
requiring a litmus test depending on specific factors,” analysis should turn “on whether the power 
the offending employee possessed was reasonably perceived by the victim, accurately or not, as 
giving that employee the power to adversely affect the victim’s working life”). 
 143. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE WORKING WOMAN 211 (1979) 
(articulating the difference between supervisor and co-worker harassment). 
05_CARLE.DOC 4/28/2006  8:55 AM 
102 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:85 2006 
harassers were aided by their agency relationship with the employer in carrying 
out sexual harassment that altered the plaintiff’s terms and conditions of 
employment such that it rose to the level of discrimination on the basis of sex.  I 
am willing to accept that not all sexual harassment cases fit this bill—that mere 
proximity and contact are not enough, as the court noted in Ellerth.144  But far 
greater weight should be placed on the informal power dynamics of workplace 
settings that allow harassers to use the agency vested in them by employers in 
order to accomplish their objectives. 
Although I have offered my own particular take on the inadequacy of sexual 
harassment law, a host of scholars have described from various perspectives the 
ways in which sexual harassment doctrine is failing to capture the harm it aims to 
address.  In a brilliant article addressing the conundrum about how to classify 
constructive discharge for purposes of the tangible employment action doctrine, 
Martha Chamallas succinctly states, “[t]he rankings denominated in the formal 
organizational chart may be far less important than the opinion of persons who 
have real clout in the organization.”145  Theresa Beiner, John Marks, Joanna 
Grossman, Ann McGinley and others have similarly addressed the inadequacy of 
the hostile environment doctrine in capturing workplace realities.146  In Marks’ apt 
words, the Supreme Court’s affirmative defense has created “a dubious safe 
harbor” for employers, based on the courts’ superficial examination of the text of 
employer sexual harassment policies.147  A comprehensive and persuasive new 
book by Theresa Beiner analyzes a host of data and makes a series of compelling 
proposals for reform.148  Beiner summarizes a large body of empirical work 
showing that women tend not to report sexual harassment for fear of the career 
consequences of doing so.149  Moreover, the data show that women’s judgment 
on this matter is rational: women who do report sexual harassment have worse 
career outcomes as a result than those who do not.150  This finding should be of 
 
 144. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742-43. 
 145. Chamallas, supra note 64, at 290. 
 146. See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO 
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 145-79 (2005) (critiquing the Ellerth standard); Joanna L. 
Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment 
Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003) (arguing for elimination of the affirmative defense and other 
reforms to strengthen sexual harassment law); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer 
Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671 (2000) (noting that under the affirmative 
defense, the employer is not liable for the first instance of a supervisor’s sexual harassment); see also 
Marks, supra note 69; cf. Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as 
“Employees” Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3, 51 (2004) (noting that formalist 
assumptions that partners possess the political power to protect themselves against discrimination 
ignores the way in which partners can lack the economic and social power within the organization to 
avoid hostile environment harassment and sex discrimination). 
 147. Marks, supra note 69, at 1422.  Another excellent body of literature critiques the courts’ trend 
toward summary dismissal of cases in general. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and 
Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 591 (2004).  Many of the leading scholars creating this literature, including Elizabeth 
Schneider, Vivian Berger, Steven Furbank, Desiree Kennedy, and Ann McGinley, gathered for an 
impressive roundtable discussion at the 2005 Law & Society Conference. 
 148. See generally BEINER, supra note 146. 
 149. Id. at 163-66. 
 150. Id. 
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concern to courts and policy makers to the extent that they are sincere in seeking to 
construct law to further the policy objectives of Title VII.  If lodging sexual 
harassment complaints with employers negatively impacts the careers of those 
who complain, how is it helping the project of achieving sexual equality in 
employment to require plaintiffs to lodge such complaints under all circumstances? 
On the basis of these and many other sets of empirical data, Beiner makes a 
series of proposals to modify sexual harassment doctrine in order better to 
address the harm of sexual harassment.  On the question of employers’ vicarious 
liability, Beiner argues that “targets of supervisor harassment should be 
compensated for the harm they experience regardless of the employer’s 
preventive efforts.”151  Under Beiner’s test, the question of employers’ efforts to 
prevent or correct sexual harassment would only arise when deciding punitive 
damages.152 
Approaches along the lines that Beiner proposes reflect the law of some 
states, such as New Jersey.153  With respect to federal law, however, such an 
approach may fail to garner sufficient support, even among feminists committed 
to ending sex discrimination in the workplace.154  Allowing employers the 
opportunity to avoid vicarious liability by showing that they have made 
reasonable efforts to prevent and redress sexual harassment arguably preserves 
the important policy objectives I pointed to at the beginning of this Article—
namely, the creation of incentives to encourage employers to take proactive efforts 
to prevent and remedy harassment without the involvement of the courts.155  Thus, 
although I am sympathetic to Beiner’s perspective, my proposal does not go as far 
as hers.  Instead, what I advocate here remains within the existing legal 
framework that permits an affirmative defense opportunity for employers, but 
argues that the showing required of employers be made far more rigorous than 
that which courts often require today. 
This approach would require the courts to examine the factual situation 
presented in particular cases in a far more searching way than many courts do 
today.156  Plaintiffs should be permitted to present background evidence concerning 
institutional culture, including on such matters as the following: Regardless of 
whether a complaint procedure exists, what were the results of the employee’s 
prior use of that procedure?  How many cases resulted in discipline against the 
harasser?  Are low-level employee harassers terminated based on incidents of 
harassment, but not powerful agents of the institution?  And what are the effects 
of friendships, good ole’ boy networks, and political alliances in the workplace at 
issue? 
 
 151. Id. at 173-74. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 175-182 (discussing New Jersey law); see also 
State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Court, 79 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2003) (holding that language of state 
anti-discrimination statute “does not suggest that an employer’s liability for sexual harassment by a 
supervisor is constrained by principles of agency law”). 
 154. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 1, at 489 (noting benefits of the Ellerth affirmative defense). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See discussion of Suders dicta, supra text accompanying notes 65-67. 
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On a related note, in co-worker harassment cases, plaintiffs should be 
allowed to present evidence concerning the informal power that persons classified 
as co-workers possess within the institution.157  Are they well-respected senior 
employees?  Do they serve important roles in which they have special access to 
decision-makers’ ears?  Do they play a role in evaluating or commenting on junior 
employees’ work?  Does their degree of willingness to train or mentor junior 
employees have a significant effect on these employees’ career prospects?  Do 
senior co-workers influence access to important job assignments or other career 
advancing opportunities?  Do they have the ability to influence co-workers’ 
attitudes toward the employee in question—for example, to ice him or her out of 
informal but career-related experiences?  Does a supervisor or co-worker have 
credible authority in making threats in order to bully an employee into granting 
sexual favors?  These are all questions that the courts should ask as aspects of 
their analysis under Ellerth as to whether employers’ policies to deter and punish 
sexual harassment were effective and adequate and whether plaintiffs’ conduct 
was reasonable under the circumstances.  But these important questions all but 
drop out of many lower courts’ analysis, as shown in the examples I discussed in 
Part II-C.  While the affirmative defense doctrine should call for a searching, 
skeptical inquiry, with the burden of proof on the employer, courts are using the 
Ellerth doctrine to dispose of cases with as little scrutiny as possible. 
A. Work by Organizational Theorists 
The work of expert organizational theorists supports the type of inquiry I 
have outlined above.  That work shows that formal organizational hierarchy 
charts do not capture the real power dynamics of a workplace.  These theorists 
understand the working of power dynamics in organizations as being different 
from the grant of formal hierarchical authority.  As one leading management 
expert puts it: 
The terms “authority” and “power” are consistently confused by students of 
Management . . . . [A]uthority [is] the right to act, or command others to act, 
toward the attainment of organizational goals.  Its unique characteristic . . . was 
that this right had legitimacy based on the authority figure’s position in the 
organization. Authority goes with the job.  You leave your managerial job and 
you give up the authority that goes with that position.  When we use the term 
“power,” we mean an individual’s capacity to influence decisions.  As such, 
authority is actually part of the larger concept of power; that is, the ability to 
influence based on an individual’s legitimate position, can affect decisions, but 
one does not require authority to have such influence.158 
Robbins goes on to explain how an employee may be low in the authority 
hierarchy but high on the power index by virtue of his or her closeness to what he 
calls the “power core.”  Closeness to the “power core” results from one’s access to 
 
 157. See, e.g., Entrot, 819 A.2d at 459 (“Also relevant would be any evidence that the alleged 
harasser controlled the workplace in subtler and indirect ways, as long as the effect was to restrict 
the victim-employee’s freedom to ignore sexually harassing conduct.”). 
 158. STEPHEN P. ROBBINS, ORGANIZATION THEORY: THE STRUCTURE AND DESIGN OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 173 (1983). 
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or relationships with key managers or possession of key organizational 
information and resources.159  As examples, Robbins explains how executive 
secretaries, long-time production engineers, and labor union officials may be part 
of the power core despite their lack of supervisory status.160  Richard Daft 
similarly summarizes the extensive literature supporting this understanding of 
how power in organizations works.161  Daft breaks down the sources of power 
individuals may utilize at different levels of an organization’s hierarchy, and notes 
that the result may be that lower level employees have more effective power than 
do those with more formal authority.162 
Another classic study of organizational management theory breaks down 
individuals’ power within organizations into six variables, some having to do 
with the person’s position or formal authority, but others with personal 
characteristics, such as referent power (for example, being a person that occupies a 
professionally coveted position) and expertise.163  This study finds that 
compliance often depends more on legitimacy, expertise and referent power than 
on ability to invoke formal rewards or punishment.164 
All of this expert research strongly suggests that the doctrinal distinction 
between supervisors and co-workers in current sexual harassment law rests on 
faulty assumptions about who may wield significant power over others in the 
workplace. 
Still other work in organizational management theory looks at how power is 
deployed and the results of its use in organizations.  Robbins describes the 
operation of power within organizations as a form of coalition politics, through 
which shifting coalitions fight for influence.165  Cynthia Cockburn takes the 
insights of organizational management experts and extends them to examine 
gender politics within organizations.166  Cockburn further describes how actors 
within institutions can use power alliances to block the rise of women within 
 
 159. Id. at 174. 
 160. Id. at 174-75, 176-77. 
 161. See RICHARD L. DAFT, ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND DESIGN 387-94 (4th ed. 1992); see also 
JEFFREY PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 137-38 
(1997) (tracing the growth of literature examining the development and exercise of power and 
influence in organizations). 
 162. See id.; see also John R.P. French Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in CLASSICS OF 
ORGANIZATION THEORY 311, 313 (Jay M. Shafritz et al. eds., 6th ed. 2004) (describing organization 
theorists’ understanding of various sources of informal power and their use); Jeffrey Pfeffer, 
Understanding the Role of Power in Decision Making, in CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra, at 
289, 290-91 (describing the relationship between power, authority, and politics in workplaces); JOHN 
SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 82-83, 101,124 (2d ed. 2000) (using social network analysis to 
analyze relationships and influence of agents in organizations using concepts of centrality, cliques, 
roles and positions). 
 163. See WILLIAM G. SCOTT, TERENCE R. MITCHELL & PHILIP H. BIRNBAUM, ORGANIZATIONAL 
THEORY: A STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 134-35 (4th ed. 1981). 
 164. Id. at 135. See also RAMON J. ALDAG & LOREN W. KUZUHARA, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
AND MANAGEMENT 298-306 (2002); NORMAN JACKSON & PIPPA CARTER, RETHINKING 
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 79-83 (2000); JOSEPH W. WEISS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND 
CHANGE 233-55 (2001). 
 165. ROBBINS, supra note 158, at 171. 
 166. See CYNTHIA COCKBURN, IN THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN’S RESISTANCE TO SEX EQUALITY IN 
ORGANIZATIONS (1991). 
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organizations.167  Insight into this phenomenon was, indeed, important to 
theorizing hostile environment sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination; 
hostile environment sexual harassment provides men lacking in formal authority 
a means to keep women out of traditionally male jobs, a point Vicki Shultz 
developed in her ground-breaking work.168  Researchers have now begun to 
conduct empirical investigations into how individuals within organizations use 
informal power to effectuate sexual harassment as well as how they use sexual 
harassment in order to exert power.169  This literature, although “still in its 
infancy,” shows that “the relationships among facets of power and types of sexual 
harassment are underarticulated,” and that power concerns arise not only in 
supervisory harassment but in co-worker and subordinate harassment as well.170 
Not only organization theory, but also general principles of agency law 
support an expanded inquiry into the harasser’s relationship to the employer for 
purposes of vicarious liability analysis.  As Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky 
have pointed out, courts have taken inconsistent and unduly cramped positions in 
analyzing the scope of vicarious liability under various federal civil rights 
statutes.171  These leading scholars argue that the best approach for courts to take 
in all these cases is one that follows common law tort principles.172  Under those 
principles, as I show below, the vicarious liability analysis for Title VII hostile 
environment claims should embrace the “aided in the agency” theory recognized 
in common law. 
B. The “Aided in the Agency” Standard 
Another way of sharpening the teeth of the test articulated in Ellerth would 
be to place greater emphasis on common law analysis of agency principles.  
Courts should ask, not whether a tangible employment action occurred, but 
whether a harasser was “aided in the agency” in committing wrongdoing by 
virtue of his or her relationship with the employer.  Put otherwise, the affirmative 
defense should create sufficient incentives to encourage employers to prevent 
harassers from using the agency or power granted them by the employer to 
commit harassment.  An employer who has not prevented the use of its agency in 
this way has failed to take sufficient preventative action—or, put otherwise, has 
failed to act with reasonable care in protecting its employees from hostile 
environment discrimination. 
The “aided in the agency” standard had been applied in diverse areas of law.  
Courts have held employers liable for the acts of managerial employees under 
section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement of Agency and related provisions in a wide 
variety of situations and fact patterns outside the employment context in which 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Schultz, supra note 117. 
 169. See YOAV VARDI & ELY WEITZ, MISBEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
MANAGEMENT (2004) (citations omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under 
Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX,  7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 759-81 (1999). 
 172. Id. 
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managers abused their positions to fulfill personal, rather than official goals.173  
Indeed, a number of courts prior to Ellerth applied this common law “aided in the 
agency” analysis to sexual harassment claims, even when the employee 
committing the harassment was not acting within the scope of his or her 
employment.174  Some states have similarly opted for this section 219(2)(d) analysis 
in interpreting their state anti-discrimination statutes. 
One such court is the New Jersey Supreme Court, which interpreted the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD)175 in  Gaines v.  Bellino.176  There, 
 
 173. See, e.g., Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) (corporation held 
liable under section 219(2)(d) for an inn manager’s rape of a guest where the manager used a key to 
the guest room he possessed by virtue of his position); Del Amora v. Metro Ford Sales & Serv., Inc., 
206 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding a car dealership liable under section 219(2)(d) for its 
salesman’s use of his position to obtain a credit report on his sister’s husband for personal reasons 
related to his sister’s pending divorce); Grease Monkey Int’l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 468, 470-75 
(Colo. 1995) (holding a company liable for its officer’s embezzlement of investors’ funds where his 
position allowed him to commit the fraud); Groob v. Keybank, 801 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) 
(applying section 219(2)(d) to conclude that a bank could be held liable where its bank officer had 
rejected plaintiffs’ loan request to buy a business and used their information to buy the business 
himself); Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48 (Vt. 2004) (sheriff’s department not held vicariously liable 
where deputy sheriff sexually assaulted a convenience store employee while patrolling his beat).  
More rarely, isolated courts apply section 219(2)(d) in civil rights-type cases.  See, e.g., LaRoche v. 
Denny’s Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371-74 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that a restaurant could be held 
vicariously liable for its manager’s refusal to serve black customers, even though he was acting 
outside the scope of his employment, when the plaintiffs relied on his apparent authority and 
acquiesced to his demands); Serda v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding 
hairdressing school vicariously liable under Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by the school 
director where the school had turned over all authority to manage the school to the director); but see 
Gebster v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (adopting actual knowledge standard for 
school liability under Title IX for teacher sexual harassment of students). 
 174. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, 112 F.3d 1437, 1445-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying section 
219(2)(d) to hold employer vicariously liable), vacated and remanded for decision consistent with Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 947 (1998); Karribian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying “aided in 
agency” standard to hold that, in a case in which a high-level supervisor was involved in hostile 
environment sexual harassment, the employer should be liable regardless of the reasonableness of 
its complaint procedures); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am. Inc.,  29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting 
that applying section 219(2)(d) creates appropriate amount of deterrence by creating incentives “in 
the amount of the potential judgments to recruit, train, and supervise their managers to prevent 
hostile environments”); McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20 (D. Ga. 1997) 
(denying summary judgment to employer despite finding that the employer took prompt and 
effective remedial action after becoming aware of the plaintiff’s complaint where a reasonable fact 
finder could conclude that the supervisor was aided in his harassing behavior by his status as an 
agent, based on the fact that he used his authority as a supervisor to require the plaintiff to come into 
his office and engage in lengthy conversations about sexual matters); Eichenwald v. Krigel’s Inc., 908 
F. Supp. 1531 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that a supervisor was “aided in accomplishing his sexual 
harassment of the plaintiffs by virtue of his high level position with the defendants”); Henry v. Gehl 
Corp., 867 F. Supp. 960, 969 (D. Kan. 1994) (noting that under section 219(2)(d) mere proximity due 
to position would not be enough, but under the facts of the case, a reasonable finder of fact could 
find that the supervisor “capitalized on his authority over the plaintiff to create an intimidating and 
sexually-charged atmosphere in which the plaintiff realized the almost certain termination facing her 
if she challenged his offensive conduct”); State v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1997) (applying 
section 219(2)(d) where employer had vested in the executive director the power to run its office); 
Lehmann v. Toys R Us, 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) (applying agency principles to analysis of employer 
liability for supervisor harassment under New Jersey anti-discrimination law). 
 175. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (2002). 
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the court granted certification to review the holding of the Appellate Division, 
which had dismissed a hostile environment workplace harassment claim under 
LAD because the employer had implemented a sexual harassment policy, 
trained employees under it, and acted promptly when the plaintiff’s 
complaint was finally brought to its attention.177  The court followed its 
earlier, pre-Ellerth precedent in Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc.,178 and held that 
“principles of agency law should control employer liability for compensatory 
damages in cases of supervisory hostile environment sexual harassment claims.”179  
Applying section 219(2)(d),180  the court explained that the “question whether a 
supervisor, who creates a hostile environment, was aided by delegated power 
to control the day-to-day work environment is a fact sensitive inquiry,” that 
requires examination of a number of questions including: (1) whether the 
employer delegated the authority to the supervisor to control the situation on 
which the plaintiff’s claims are based; (2) whether the supervisor exercised that 
authority; (3) whether the exercise of authority resulted in a violation of LAD; 
and (4) whether the delegated authority aided the supervisor in thus injuring 
the plaintiff.181  The court further reiterated its earlier precedent that had given 
teeth to this test, explaining that it should encompass the examination of facts 
such as “the existence of effective sensing or monitoring mechanisms to check 
the trustworthiness of the policies and complaint structures, ‘evidence of’ an 
unequivocal commitment from the highest levels of the employer that 
harassment would not be tolerated, ‘and’ demonstration of that policy 
commitment by consistent practice.”182 
Applying section 219(2)(d) to the facts of cases I have discussed here, one 
might add to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s list of relevant questions at the 
affirmative defense stage, factors such as whether the supervisor used his or her 
agency or authority to keep the plaintiff in the office or other area where 
harassment was committed, whether he or she used actual or apparent authority 
to make credible threats that would lead a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
situation to succumb to the harassment and/or not to report it, and whether the 
employer had in place and enforced a policy requiring supervisors to report 
knowledge of sexual harassment up the chain of command. 
At bottom, answering the key question as to how strong to make the Ellerth 
affirmative defense requires a return to the objectives of recognizing sexual 
harassment as a Title VII claim in the first place.  Leading scholars propose many 
such objectives on descriptive and normative grounds.183  Sexual harassment is 
 
 176. 801 A.2d 322, 329 (N.J. 2002). 
 177. Id. at 328. 
 178. 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993). 
 179. Gaines, 801 A.2d at 328. 
 180. Id. at 313. 
 181. Id. at 329 (citing Lehman, 626 A.2d at 462). 
 182. Id. at 329 (citing Lehman, 626 A.2d at 463); see also Velez v. Jersey City, 817 A.2d 409 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer where facts cast 
doubt on adequacy of employer’s response, even though no further incidents of harassment 
occurred). 
 183. See, e.g., Katherine Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) 
(arguing that the wrong of sexual harassment is its use as a mechanism to enforce gender norms); 
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supposed to be about sex discrimination, after all, but it is also probably about 
something else—at least in the minds of fact finders, whom, statistics show, are 
more likely to impose liability for sexual harassment than for other forms of Title 
VII discrimination.184  The finding that sexual harassment violates anti-
discrimination law stems from an implicit policy against the abuse of power 
obtained or held by virtue of employment, where such an abuse of power is 
implemented on the basis of the sex of the plaintiff.185  If this is indeed an 
important objective underlying the recognition of hostile environment sexual 
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, the key to the analysis should be 
whether power has been abused in this way.186 
If power obtained or held by virtue of employment has been abused in 
carrying out sexual harassment, then the harasser has been “aided in the 
agency”—in other words, he or she has been helped in his or her objective by 
virtue of the agency relationship with the principal.  If that is the case, then under 
standard principles of agency law, the employer should be held vicariously liable.  
This test captures the harm of a harasser’s abuse of power to commit sexual 
harassment without leading to the conclusion the Court feared, namely, that all 
harassers are “aided in the agency” by virtue of mere proximity to their prey.  
Under the test I propose, which probes for abuse of power granted by the 
employer, courts should ask whether the harasser used power over the plaintiff 
held by virtue of the employment relationship—through threats, intimidation, or 
similar acts—that would cause a reasonable employee to submit to the harassment 
or not report it.  The mere coincidence of co-proximity would not meet this 
standard. 
The Court has made matters enormously and unduly complicated in its 
cases, but that may be because it is seeking to dance around these basic principles.  
The matter really is, or should be, much more straightforward.  Application of the 
“aided in the agency” test implements the policy objectives of Title VII, and helps 
 
Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182 (Catherine A. 
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegal, eds., 2004) [hereinafter DIRECTIONS] (warning against anti-gay uses of 
sexual harassment law); Vicki Schultz, supra note 117, at 1 (arguing that the chief harm of sexual 
harassment should be conceived as its use to block women from achieving workplace parity). 
 184. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Court,  1 J.  EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) (presenting data showing plaintiffs’ low 
chances of winning employment discrimination cases and appeals after success before trial courts); 
David B. Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination 
and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 511, 535 (2003) (in a study of California jury verdicts in employment discrimination cases, 
plaintiffs won 68% of sexual harassment cases but only 41% of other discrimination cases.); Michael 
J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1887, 1943-44 (2004) (summarizing evidence showing that employment discrimination 
plaintiffs who allege claims other than sex harassment fare much worse than plaintiffs in other types 
of lawsuits). 
 185. Reva Siegal documents the history of creative turns in the development of anti-
discrimination law in Reva B. Siegal, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in 
DIRECTIONS, supra note 183, at 1, 18-19. 
 186. Of course, to punish or deter the abuse of power in the workplace only when it is 
implemented according to an impermissible characteristic such as race or sex is wholly inadequate, 
as Regina Austin and others have pointed out.  See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, 
and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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to ensure that merit-worthy cases are not barred by an expansive application of the 
affirmative defense doctrine. 
C. Courts That Get It Right 
The argument might be made that the test I propose is unworkable—that no 
court is going to be sufficiently sensitive to the nuances of informal power 
dynamics in the workplace as I have proposed.  But there is a case that belies 
that argument, because in that case, the court got it right.  At first glance this 
may seem surprising because the court is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, hardly a sympathetic venue for plaintiffs in employment and 
civil rights cases.  On closer inspection, the sense of surprise goes away—the 
author of the opinion is Judge Diana Gribbon Motz.187  The case is Williams v. 
Spartan Communications, Inc.,188 and it is, unfortunately but not surprisingly, 
listed as an unpublished opinion.189 
Williams involved a plaintiff who was sexually assaulted three times during 
business trips she took with her supervisor.190  A magistrate judge ruled that the 
defendant, Spartan, had satisfied both elements of the hostile environment 
affirmative defense and granted summary judgment in its favor,191 but the 
Fourth Circuit reversed.192  The plaintiff acknowledged that she knew the 
company had an anti-harassment policy and had attended meetings and seen 
posted notices about it, which included the identities of the persons with whom 
she could file a complaint.193  Judge Motz wrote, however, that 
while the existence of an antiharassment policy and prompt corrective action 
pursuant to it provides important evidence that an employer has acted to meet 
the first prong of the affirmative defense, such evidence does not compel this 
conclusion.194 
Instead, Motz explained, the employer must also have been reasonably 
effective in preventing sexual harassment.195  The magistrate judge had ignored 
substantial evidence that Spartan’s policy was not an effective program.196  This 
evidence included the following facts: (1) that Spartan’s management tolerated 
and participated in lewd conversations and publication of sexually explicit jokes 
 
 187. Judge Motz is perhaps best known for her recent, stinging dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
316 F.3d 450, 477 (4th Cir. 2003), in which she argued against the indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen 
without charges or access to a lawyer. See Nat Hentoff, Who Made George W. Bush Our King?, VILLAGE 
VOICE, July. 25, 2003, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0331,hentoff,45847,6.html 
(praising Judge Motz’s opinion). 
 188. No. 99-1566, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5776 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 2000). 
 189. For an excellent article critiquing the growing practice of classifying opinions as 
unpublished, see Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. 
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004). 
 190. Williams, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5776, at *2. 
 191. Id. at *5. 
 192. Id. at *11. 
 193. Id. at *5. 
 194. Id. at *6 (emphasis in original). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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and cartoons in the workplace, (2) that complaints to a manager by an employee, 
other than the plaintiff, about foul language and sexist jokes had produced no 
corrective action, (3) that the sexual harassment policy threatened to punish 
employees who falsely reported sexual harassment with discipline up to and 
including termination, but did not promise to protect complainants from 
retaliation for pursuing complaints, and (4) that plaintiff’s harasser had a close 
relationship to other senior managers at the company.197  Judge Motz noted that 
even though the policy commendably created multiple avenues for complaint, all 
of those avenues would have required the plaintiff to report to someone who was 
close to the harasser or who reported to a member of senior management who was 
a good friend of the harasser.198  Williams, moreover, had produced evidence that 
an employee decided not to complain of harassment because of fear of being 
fired.199  In short, this judge displayed the requisite sensitivity to how informal 
power dynamics in the workplace can transform a sexual harassment complaint 
policy that appears reasonable on its face into an illusory sham for women 
working within the particular power dynamics of their organization.  Only the 
kind of context-sensitive, nuanced examination Judge Motz was willing to 
undertake is sufficient to probe these issues. 
A second example of an opinion in which a court engages in searching, fact 
sensitive analysis, also written by a female judge,200 is Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic.201  
Petrosino was an installation and repair technician at the employer’s garage, and 
for most of her years of employment was the only female technician at that 
garage.202  In alleging hostile environment sex discrimination, she complained of 
constant sexually demeaning conversations conveying a disrespect for women 
and crude sexual graffiti scrawled by co-workers inside the terminal boxes with 
which she had to work, including images of headless women with their legs in the 
air, women’s legs spread open, men with their penises out or having sex with 
animals, and messages that male and female employees performed sex acts with 
supervisors in order to advance in their careers, including at least one picture of 
Petrosino engaged in such behavior.203  Petrosino had also been physically 
attacked in a parking lot and groped and kissed, endured jokes and terminal box 
graffiti about this incident, and told by her supervisors that she was “a damn 
woman,” she should “calm her big tits down,” her job concerns were attributable 
 
 197. Id at *7-8. 
 198. Id. at *9. 
 199. Id. 
 200. By pointing out the female identity of two judges, I do not mean to hint at an essentialist 
implication that women judges necessarily do better in sexual harassment cases, though some 
empirical evidence suggests that a combination of variables involving race, gender, age, and political 
affiliation does affect the likelihood that judges will find for plaintiffs in sex discrimination and sex 
harassment cases. See BEINER, supra note 146, at 7-8 (summarizing studies). Essentialism has been 
roundly trounced on both theoretical and normative grounds, see, e.g., Margaret Radin, Reply: Please 
Be Careful With Cultural Feminism, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1567 (1993), but, that noted, experience plainly 
does affect judgment, in unpredictable and individually mediated ways, cf. Susan Carle, Women in 
Law, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 795, 796 (2000), and to throw out this important legal realist 
insight simply because its vulgar extension into essentialism is discredited seems to me unnecessary. 
 201. Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 202. Id. at 214. 
 203. Id. at 215. 
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to her menstrual cycle, and that women were “too damned thin skinned” to work 
at the garage.204 
Petrosino asserted that she complained informally and formally about the 
hostile environment to co-workers and supervisors.205  She filed a labor grievance 
against her direct supervisor for harassment and prevailed, but no discipline was 
imposed; instead, she and her supervisor were sent to a seminar to help them work 
out their differences.206  When she attempted to use the opportunity to voice her 
concerns, her supervisor told her to “just keep your mouth shut and do what I 
tell you.”207  When she complained about this comment to a senior manager, he 
offered to transfer her but she declined.208  Her supervisor subsequently 
reprimanded her for going over his head and took away job responsibilities that 
would have prepared her for a future management position.209  Soon after, she 
resigned, without having complained about this last action.210 
On these facts, the district court, rather incredibly to my mind, granted 
summary judgment to Bell Atlantic on all claims, which included tangible 
employment action, hostile environment, and constructive discharge theories.211  
The Second Circuit reversed in an opinion written by Judge Reena Raggi.212  
Declining to reach Petrosino’s tangible employment action claims, the court held 
that Bell Atlantic had failed to meet its burden on its affirmative defense claims 
against the hostile environment charges.213  It held that the fact that there was a 
documented corporate policy against sexual harassment, as well as an ethics 
hotline through which employees could report incidents of harassment, was not 
dispositive, especially in light of the fact that Petrosino asserted that she had used 
the hotline but no one had investigated her complaint or taken any remedial 
action.214  Bell Atlantic argued that Petrosino had failed to return follow-up calls 
after her initial report and had failed to pursue many other incidents of 
harassment through the hotline procedures.  However, the court noted that these 
disputes about facts and their implications were correctly left to the trier of fact, 
not to the court at the summary judgment stage.215 
 
 204. Id. at 214-15. 
 205. Id. at 215. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 216 (citation to the record omitted). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 216. 
 211. Id. at 213. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 224-25. 
 214. Id. at 226. 
 215. Id. Some other cases within the Second Circuit similarly subjects employers’ assertions of 
the affirmative defense doctrine to more rigorous scrutiny. See, e.g., Presley v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 
356 F. Supp. 2d 109,129-31 (D. Conn. 2005) (denying summary judgment to employer where there 
was evidence that a supervisor failed to report to superiors in the company hierarchy his knowledge 
of allegations of sexual harassment ); Miller v. Edward Jones & Co., 355 F. Supp. 2d 629 (D. Conn. 
2005) (denying summary judgment to an employer that made a decision not to separate the plaintiff 
and her alleged harasser, on the ground that a reasonable trier of fact could view this as evidence of 
an inadequate company response).  See also Mack, 326 F.3d at 125 (rejecting employer’s claim that an 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The problem with the lower courts’ application of the Ellerth defense is that 
the key question—namely, whether the supervisor’s misconduct has been aided 
by the agency relationship—is not answered by the affirmative defense doctrine 
as currently articulated.  The affirmative defense doctrine addresses workplace-
level deterrence and employer notice objectives, as Susan Sturm and others have 
pointed out.  It thus can play an important role in encouraging policy change at 
the workplace level and could stand as a positive example of how the law can be 
used to progressive ends in shaping social relations.  But the problem with the 
Ellerth affirmative defense doctrine, as courts are currently applying it, is that it 
does not ask the legally relevant question, given that Congress specifically defined 
“employer” for purposes of employer liability under Title VII as including an 
“agent.”216  That definition states that employers are liable for the actions of their 
agents.  Under common law agency principles, the touchstone for employer 
liability is whether an agent was aided in his or her agency—in other words, by 
his or her power conferred by virtue of an agency relationship with the 
employer—in carrying out the acts in question.  Answering that question in the 
sexual harassment context requires a searching and fact-sensitive examination of 
how power dynamics in particular workplaces operate.  When a plaintiff has 
presented evidence that could lead a reasonable fact finder to find such an abuse 
of employer-granted power, courts should allow plaintiffs to pass the summary 
judgment hurdle.  In these circumstances, indeed, employers have failed to meet 
their burden of proof under the Court’s affirmative defense standard, which 
requires, after all, that employers exercise “reasonable care”217 and take measures 
that are “readily accessible” and “effective” in preventing sexual harassment,218 
and that plaintiffs do not act “unreasonably”219 under the particular 
circumstances. 
 
employee committing sexual harassment was a co-worker in light of the power he possessed over 
plaintiff). 
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
 217. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 218. Suders, 542 U.S. at 134. 
 219. Id.; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
